



Credit Flows to Businesses During 
the Great Recession
Pedro Amaral 
During the last recession, credit ﬂ  ows suffered their worst slowdown since World War II. A look at selected credit 
market measures gives some insight into why the slowdown was so severe. The measures also show that in spite 
of the size of the shock, credit ﬂ  ows actually recovered extremely quickly—a testament to the depth of the credit 
markets, and possibly the interventions that were taken to support them. 
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Credit ﬂ  ows are the lifeblood of a well-functioning 
economy. By channeling funds from savers to borrowers, 
ﬁ  nancial institutions enable businesses (and individuals) to 
pursue projects and activities. Disruptions to this process 
are costly, a lesson we learned in the last recession, as 
the problems that arguably started in the ﬁ  nancial sector 
quickly spread to the whole economy. 
The downturn in credit ﬂ  ows to nonﬁ  nancial businesses 
during the last recession was the most severe in the post–
World War II period. What factors led to such a large 
reduction in credit ﬂ  ows? Although a precise answer to this 
question is beyond the scope of this Commentary (in fact, the 
economics profession cannot agree on one), there are some 
data that can give us clues.
One thing the data make clear is that there were multiple 
causes of the credit drop-off. While the ﬁ  nancial system 
as a whole extended less credit, institutional differences 
played important roles in how and why the reductions 
took place. Some ﬁ  nancial institutions had ﬁ  nancing 
problems that caused them to reduce their lending; others 
appeared well funded but chose to decrease their lending 
to the nonﬁ  nancial business sector, opting for less risky 
investments. We argue, for example, that the high cost of 
obtaining credit during the recession—higher than ever be-
fore in the post-WWII period—not only afﬁ  rms that ﬁ  rms 
became worse risks, but also shows that some lenders 
faced greater credit constraints and others grew more risk 
averse and hungry for liquidity.
One thing worth noting is that while credit markets suf-
fered unprecedented levels of stress, the recovery, judg-
ing by the indicators we will look at here, was extremely 
quick. The rapid bounce-back is a testament to the depth 
of the credit markets surely, but it is also something to take 
into account when trying to assess whether, on balance, 
the credit market interventions that were put in place were 
positive or not. 
How Bad Was It? 
The Flow of Funds Accounts compiled by the Board of 
Governors of the Federal Reserve System contain a slew of 
information on U.S. ﬁ  nancial ﬂ  ows, including how much 
nonﬁ  nancial businesses borrow each quarter (excluding 
farming businesses). When these data are plotted over time 
(ﬁ  gure 1), it is clear that no other post-WWII recession 
comes remotely close to the most recent one in terms of 
the magnitude of the reduction in borrowing ﬂ  ows. While 
in previous recessions borrowing ﬂ  ows fell by at most 
2 percent of GDP, this time they fell 5 percent.1
Typical recessions involve declines in both the supply of 
credit as well as the demand for it. It can be hard, though, 
if not impossible, to isolate declines in supply and demand 
in the data. Financial institutions wish to supply less credit 
because they face liquidity or solvency difﬁ  culties of their 
own, because the economic environment becomes more 
risky in general, or because they perceive their potential 
borrowers’ future prospects to be worse. This last reason 
also means the demand for loans itself may decrease. 
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Banking Practices provides us with some information on 
both supply and demand conditions in credit markets. 
One thing the survey captures is how much tighter credit 
standards have become on commercial and industrial lines 
of credit (excluding mergers and acquisitions). Tighter 
credit standards are a proxy for reductions in the supply 
of credit. Data from the survey suggest that credit stan-
dards became considerably tighter in this recession than in 
the previous one, for businesses of all sizes (ﬁ  gure 2). Of 
course, the data from the survey are qualitative and should 
be interpreted with some degree of care. In addition, the 
data cover only bank lending, a small fraction of total ﬂ  ows. 
The survey also asks if demand for the same type of loans 
has been stronger or weaker than normal, and on that is-
sue, the latest recession does not look any worse than the 
previous one (ﬁ  gure 3). 
Figures 2 and 3 together suggest that, at least as far as 
commercial and industrial loans are concerned, both 
supply and demand contracted, but given the qualitative 
nature of the survey data, it is impossible to measure their 
relative contribution.
Why Was It So Severe?
It is clear that credit ﬂ  ows fell more during the Great 
Recession than at any other time in recent history. Figuring 
out why is not so easy, as a number of interrelated events 
could be responsible. The funds available for lending were 
scarcer; ﬁ  nancial institutions presumably became more risk 
averse as their balance sheets worsened and their attitudes 
towards risk changed; and feedback mechanisms were at 
work—as economic conditions worsened, the businesses 
that ﬁ  nancial institutions would lend to became less cred-
itworthy since their own balance sheets and future 
prospects had deteriorated. Moreover, for this same 
reason, their demand for funds also retracted.
To start the investigation, let us look at borrowing 
and lending ﬂ  ows in credit market instruments for the 
ﬁ  nancial sector as a whole. Financial institutions are, 
compared to the average nonﬁ  nancial business, highly 
leveraged, meaning they borrow a lot relative to their 
own capital in order to conduct their operations, which 
involve, for the most part, lending. It is no surprise 
then that borrowing and lending by ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions are highly correlated. Figure 4 shows a measure 
of these ﬂ  ows as a fraction of GDP.2
The ﬁ  gure shows that reductions in their own ﬁ  nanc-
ing were statistically associated with less lending by 
ﬁ  nancial institutions. The correlation between borrow-
ing and lending ﬂ  ows is 0.82 for the whole sample, 
but jumps to 0.96 from 2004 on, when ﬂ  ows become 
virtually synchronous. The correlation stops short of 
demonstrating causation of course, but it is suggestive 
that, at least for the sector as a whole, ﬁ  nancial institu-
tions could not have lent more even if they wanted to. 
By lumping all types of ﬁ  nancial institutions together 
in ﬁ  gure 4, however, we are ignoring a substantial 
amount of institutional variety. For one thing, the 
ﬁ  nancial system is now very different from what it 
was 30 or 40 years ago: banks in general play a much 
smaller role than they used to, as the role of the 
shadow banking system has grown. Second, not all of 
the lending in the ﬁ  gure is to businesses; a substan-
tial amount is mortgage lending. Finally, depository 
institutions rely less on credit market instruments for 
funding and more on deposits, and in addition they 
Figure 2. Credit Standard Changes (commercial and 
industrial loans)
Figure 1. Borrowing by Nonﬁ  nancial Businesses as a 
Fraction of GDP
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
Source: Flow of Funds, Federal Reserve Board; author’s calculations.
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
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2011-15.indd   4 8/31/2011   2:01:44 AMhave access to central bank liquidity, Federal Home Loan 
Bank advances, and the federal funds market.
The reduced credit supply during the recession was associ-
ated not only with ﬁ  nancing issues, but also with impor-
tant shifts in portfolio allocations. Consider the share of 
ﬁ  nancial assets that commercial banks allocated to “safe” 
investments—here deﬁ  ned to be the sum of vault cash, 
reserves at the Federal Reserve, checkable deposits and 
currency, and Treasury and municipal securities. While it 
averaged roughly 3 percent in 2006, it jumped to 10 per-
cent in 2010. Some of this jump reﬂ  ects no doubt a ﬂ  ight to 
safety in light of the higher perceived risk of other invest-
ments (in particular, lending to businesses whose prospects 
had worsened), but also, for some institutions, liquidity 
and solvency concerns.
While borrowing and lending volume exchanged in the 
credit market carries important information, so does the 
price of credit. Businesses usually have a choice between 
ﬁ  nancing themselves internally on the one hand, perhaps 
by liquidating assets or retaining earnings, or, on the other 
hand, obtaining funds from an external source. The higher 
the opportunity cost of their internal funds, the more likely 
ﬁ  rms are to choose external ﬁ  nancing. It is usually costlier 
to raise funds externally: the lender knows less about the 
ﬁ  rm’s business prospects than the ﬁ  rm, and it must incur 
costs to evaluate the likelihood of default and to monitor 
the ﬁ  rm after the loan is made. 
The difference between the cost of raising funds externally 
and internally is called the external ﬁ  nance premium, and 
it can give us important insights into the state of credit 
markets and how they affect the whole economy. Theory 
predicts that a company’s external ﬁ  nance premium should 
be inversely related to its ﬁ  nancial situation (net worth, fu-
ture cash ﬂ  ows, liquidity, etc). That means that the average 
external ﬁ  nance premium in the overall economy is coun-
tercyclical, as it tends to increase when GDP decreases and 
decrease when GDP rises. 
One measure of the external ﬁ  nance premium is the spread 
between corporate bond yields and U.S. Treasury bonds 
of the same maturity. Just like consumers, companies can 
get bank loans or draw on existing credit lines, but they 
also have the option of issuing bonds, IOUs that promise 
the bearer a certain interest rate after a deﬁ  ned period of 
time. While the rates charged on bank loans are normally 
private information, the yields on bonds that are traded 
on secondary markets are public information and convey 
information not only about the borrower but about the 
state of the credit market as a whole.
Different companies will, in general, obtain different rates 
from the market when they auction off their bonds. Po-
tential creditors look at a company’s ﬁ  nancial strength and 
form expectations about the probability that they will actu-
ally get repaid. They then demand a return that reﬂ  ects 
that estimation. The smaller the expected probability of a 
default, all other things being equal, the lower the interest 
rate they will require. The spreads between the interest 
rates associated with different types of bonds contain infor-
mation about default risk, but they also reﬂ  ect information 
about how the market values that risk. 
There is always a positive spread between corporate 
bonds and U.S. Treasury bonds of the same maturity. One 
reason for that is that the market assumes there is some 
chance that the average corporation will default, but little 
to no chance that the U.S government will. Another reason 
is the risk premium. The risk premium is the price that the 
market places on the default risk. Consider two companies 
Figure 3. Demand for Commercial and Industrial Loans Figure 4. Borrowing and Lending by Financial Institutions 
as a Fraction of GDP
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
Source: Federal Reserve Board.
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
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whose expected default rates are the same, but the struc-
ture of their businesses is such that one is more likely to 
default when the economy is doing well, while the other 
is more likely to do it when the economy is in trouble. 
Everything else being the same then, a default by the latter 
company is more costly to creditors, as it is more likely to 
occur at a time when their own balance sheets are prob-
ably also suffering. As a consequence, they will demand a 
higher return on their loan. This extra compensation is the 
risk premium.
Spreads between corporate bonds and government bonds 
of similar maturities are not a perfect measure of the 
external ﬁ  nance premium, however. They reﬂ  ect different 
tax treatments the two types of assets are subject to, for 
example, and the different liquidity characteristics of the 
bonds, that is, how costly it is to convert the bonds into 
cash by selling them in the secondary market. Generally, it 
is more costly to convert corporate bonds than treasuries, 
so creditors will demand a liquidity premium in the form 
of higher interest rates for corporate bonds.
Figure 5 shows the cyclical component’s contribution to 
the spread between Moody’s seasoned BAA corporate 
bond index and 20-year Treasury bonds. By focusing on 
frequencies between 6 and 32 quarters, most of the short-
er-term effects like liquidity disruptions which give rise to 
liquidity premia drop out, as do longer-term effects like 
differences in tax treatment.
This spread is countercyclical and was at a post-WWII 
high during the last downturn. One might argue this is not 
surprising given this was the largest post-WWII reces-
sion, but even accounting for that, the spike in the spread 
stands out as the largest. GDP fell by two standard devia-
tions relative to its trend in the latest recession, something 
that is not unprecedented, as it happened in both the 1974 
and 1982 recessions. Although this is not something ﬁ  gure 
5 shows, in each of these two occasions, the spread only 
jumped two standard deviations above its longer term 
trend. This time around it peaked at four standard devia-
tions above its trend.
Even though this fact helps us gauge the magnitude of the 
stress credit markets faced in the latest recession, we would 
like a better understanding of what was behind this in-
crease. Did the spread shoot up because of increases in the 
expected probability of default or in the risk premium as-
sociated with such defaults? Or was it because lenders ﬂ  ed 
to the safety and convenience of treasuries, a much more 
liquid instrument the demand for which tends to increase 
in times of crisis? 
While we will not be able to get a deﬁ  nitive answer to this 
question, as it is hard to break down the spread into its the-
oretical components, we can learn something by breaking 
the spread into two further components. One is the spread 
between BAA-rated bonds and AAA-rated ones (these are 
issued by companies judged by creditors to be in a sounder 
ﬁ  nancial position and therefore less likely to default), and 
the other is the spread between AAA-rated bonds and 
20-year Treasury bonds. The idea is that by looking at the 
BAA-AAA spread we can abstract from shocks that are spe-
ciﬁ  c to the government bonds market, and therefore carry 
no information about the external ﬁ  nance premium, but 
nonetheless get transmitted to the BAA-Treasury spread. 
Figure 6 presents measures of the cyclical component’s con-
tributions to such spreads. The cyclical component of the 
BAA-AAA spread, our preferred measure of the external 
ﬁ  nance premium, registered a post-WWII maximum dur-
ing the recession. Moreover, its contribution to the overall 
Figure 6. Decomposing the BAA to Treasury Bond Spread Figure 5. BAA to Treasury Bond Spread
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
Source: Haver Analytics; author’s calculations. 
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions. 
Source: Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
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In sum, when looking at what might be behind the sharp 
decline in credit ﬂ  ows to nonﬁ  nancial businesses, there 
was a ﬂ  ight to liquidity, to be sure, as overall uncertainty 
jumped. But also, as economic conditions worsened, and 
nonﬁ  nancial balance sheets and expected returns took a 
turn for the worse, these companies became worse risks, as 
the market for corporate bonds shows, which contributed 
to further declines in credit ﬂ  ows. 
One last thing worth noting is that while these channels 
suffered stress levels not seen before in the post-WWII pe-
riod, the recovery, as given by the credit market indicators 
we have looked at, was extremely quick. This turnaround 
is testament to the depth of the credit markets surely, but 
also something to take into account when trying to assess 
whether, on balance, the credit market interventions that 
were put in place were positive or not. 
Footnotes
1. Note that I adjusted the borrowing ﬂ  ows in two ways 
in order to compare credit market outcomes across reces-
sions. First I scaled the ﬂ  ows by the economy’s GDP, so as 
to make the variations in credit ﬂ  ows proportional to the 
size of the overall downturn; second, I isolated movements 
that occur at business cycle frequencies (6 to 32 quarters). 
This means I removed a growth trend that is associ-
ated with longer-term movements, as well as short-term 
movements that reﬂ  ect day-to-day randomness. (More 
precisely, I ﬁ  ltered out movements below 6 quarters and 
above 32 quarters using Christiano and Fitzgerald’s (2003) 
band-pass ﬁ  lter.) This results in a component that reﬂ  ects 
changes in fundamental economic conditions occurring 
around business cycles. The component can be thought of 
as a deviation from the longer-term trend and the short-
term movements, and is the reason why the series ﬂ  uctu-
ates around a trendless mean and is a lot smoother than 
the actual data.
2. We again used a band-pass ﬁ  lter to restrict attention to 
business-cycle frequencies.
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BAA-Treasury spread was two-thirds, which is high in his-
torical terms. Even though there was also a large increase 
in the absolute contribution of the AAA-Treasury spread, 
it was neither the largest increase by historical standards, 
nor enough to keep its contribution from decreasing in 
relative terms. 
There are other possible proxies for the external ﬁ  nance 
premium. Gertler and Lown (1999), for example, advocate 
looking at the spread between high yield (or junk) bonds 
and AAA bonds, but the picture one would obtain is similar.
One can argue that the BAA-AAA spread is not entirely 
driven by default risk and its market price. There is also a 
liquidity premium between the two different bond catego-
ries. One way to proxy for default risk, as Krishnamurthy 
and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010) suggest, is to look at vola-
tility in stock market returns. This volatility measure is 
highly correlated with measures of expected default prob-
abilities. Figure 7 shows this measure for the S&P 500 and 
indicates that default risk, as measured by this proxy, was 
at its highest in the latest recession. Moreover, while the 
correlation of the volatility in stock market returns and the 
BAA-AAA spread is positive at 0.59 from 1961 to 2010, 
this value jumped to an astounding 0.98 in the 2004-2010 
period, possibly indicating that during this period default 
risk and the BAA-AAA spread moved in lockstep.
The evidence on corporate bond spreads seems to indicate 
this was indeed the recession where credit market stress, as 
measured by the external ﬁ  nance premium, was at its high-
est. Although the analysis here does not allow one to prop-
erly control for increases in the liquidity premium, which 
might have contributed to the spreads as well , it seems to 
show that default risk and its pricing played a very promi-
nent role in the external ﬁ  nance premium’s increase, even 
at a time when the liquidity premium was itself very high.
Figure 7  Volatility of Weekly S&P 500 Returns 
(standard deviation)
Note: Shaded bars indicate recessions.
Source: Haver Analytics; author’s calculations.
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